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"The term hearsay", said Pitt Taylor, "is used with reference to
what is done or written, as well as to what is spoken; and, in its legal
sense, it denotes that kind of evidence which does not derive its value
solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests
also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person." I
Taylor's definition is noteworthy in its express inclusion of conduct"what is done"-the usual phrasing of the rule merely proscribing
out-of-court "assertions". 2 It is particularly noteworthy, because,
while in stating the rule and in identifying the reasons for it, Taylor
"in great part" avowedly followed Greenleaf, who closely followed
Phillipps; neither Greenleaf nor Phillipps, in defining hearsay, condemned more than what was "written" or "spoken". 8
But in thus amplifying previous definitions of hearsay, Taylor
was on solid ground. According to the prevailing doctrine then and
now, the hearsay rule will exclude, except in a few situations, evidence
of conduct, though non-verbal and non-assertive, if its relevancy depends upon inferences from the conduct to the belief of the actor to
the fact believed 4 (unless, of course, it be evidence of a party's conduct, offered against him). For example, when defendant's defense
in a criminal case is that another (say X) committed the crime,
t B. S., 1917, LL. B., igig, University of Washington; Assistant U. S. Attorney,
Seattle, 1921-22; chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Washington State Legislature,
1927-31; executive secretary, Judicial Council of State of Washington, 1927-31; prac-
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2. "The Hearsay rule, as accepted in our law, signifies a rule rejecting assertions,
offered testimonially which have not been in some way subjected to the test of crossexamination." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 194o) § 1362.
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The problem has been considered by McCormick, The

Borderland of Hearsay (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 489; by Morgan, Hearsay and NonHearsay (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 1138; The Hearsay Rule (1937) 12 WASH. L. REV.
1, 7; and by Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Ride (1912) 26 HARv. L. REv.

146, 148.
(192)

SILENCE AS HEARSAY

evidence that X fled is inadmissible. The logical usefulness of the
evidence requires us to infer first that because X fled he believed
himself guilty and second, that because he believed himself guilty, he
was, in fact, guilty.
What of negative conduct, i. e., inaction? Particularly, what of
silence, the failure to speak or write? Suppose, for instance, on an
issue as to the quality of goods sold, it appearing that the particular
goods were part of a larger lot, the remainder of which had been
sold to other customers, the seller proposes to show that no complaints
as to quality were received from these other customers. Is the offered
evidence inadmissible hearsay? Or, suppose on an issue as to the
service of a summons, it is proposed to be shown that the person
alleged to have been served never mentioned the writ to the members
of his immediate family. May the alleged service be negatived in this
fashion against an objection invoking the hearsay rule?
In each of the supposed cases it is clear that the relevancy of
the offered evidence depends upon inferences from the failure to speak
to the belief of the silent individual as to the relevant fact (in the first
illustration, that the goods sold were of satisfactory quality, in the
second, that he had not been served) to the relevant fact itself.
Now, inaction, while of a negative sort, is, nevertheless, conduct,
i. e. behavior, deportment. To be literally comprehensive, therefore,
Taylor's definition should be enlarged to the point of embracing "what
is not done", as well as "what is done". And, of course, failure to
speak or to write, i. e. silence, is a variety of "what is not done".
Theoretically, then, evidence of silence when proposed as the basis
of an inference to the belief of the silent individual, this belief to form
the basis of a further inference to the fact believed, will run afoul of
the hearsay rule. And such has been the holding in most of the cases
where the hearsay objection has been raised. 5 New York courts have
said that it is not only "purely hearsay evidence" 6 but "most mis5. In respect to conduct, the hearsay point often (probably more often than not)

escapes counsel and, consequently, the court. "This variety of hearsay (conduct) does
not appear to have received much attention in practice. Counsel probably are not alert
to recognize as hearsay, evidence in the guise of ordinary mechanical action, and no
doubt testimony as to personal conduct is often received without protest, which so far
as the issue is concerned only amounts to a voucher as to a relevant fact." TRFG.AiTHEN, THE LAW OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE (1915) 32. For example, in Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash.- 462, 85 P. (2d) 1095 (1938), on an issue as to the making of a second
modification of a contract for the sale of a hotel, proof in behalf of the defendant purchaser that, after the expiration of the first modification, she continued to act in accordance therewith, apparently went in without objection and was treated by the court
as corroborative of the purchaser's testimony that the first modification agreement had
been orally extended. For reference to a number of cases where evidence of silence
(i. e., failure to give notice or make complaint) might have been objected to as hearsay,
but apparently was not, see note 56 infra.
6. James K. Thomson, Inc. v. International Compositions Co., 191 App. Div. 553,
181 N. Y. Supp. 637 (ist Dep't 1920).
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chievous evidence"; 7 a Texas court has called it "pure hearsay" 8 and
because "negative in form", it has been considered by the North Carolina court to be "all the more incompetent". 9
However, before turning to the cases which deal specifically with
silence as hearsay, it may be profitable to venture an estimate of the
validity of the prevailing doctrine which extends the hearsay stigma
to non-assertive conduct in general, because, as has already been noted,
"silence" is merely a sort of conduct.
It is, of course, familiar doctrine, repeated here merely for the
sake of continuity in the discussion, that the hearsay rule rests on "the
belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements
is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used
as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test." 10
"It is the experience of every court and every lawyer," said a great
Western judge many years ago, "that cross-examination is the most
powerful instrument known to the law in eliciting truth or in discovering error in statements made in chief, whether that error arise from
mistaken judgment and careless observation and expression, or from
a corrupt desire and intent to pervert the truth." 1
The utility of an intelligent and carefully planned cross-examination lies in its efficacy in bringing to light deficiencies, first, in the
witness' observation or in his opportunity or capacity for observation of the facts about which he testifies; second, in the quality of
his present recollection of the impressions resulting from that observation; third, in his testimonial expression or narration as a faithful,
accurate and complete reproduction of his present recollection; and
finally, in the veracity of the witness, that is to say, his determinationat least his willingness and desire-to faithfully, accurately and completely communicate to the tribunal his present recollection.
In respect to an out-of-court assertion offered as proof of the
truth of the matter asserted, danger may lie in any or all of these
directions. Though the tenor of the declaration may imply otherwise,
it is entirely possible that a cross-examination of the declarant would
disclose that he either did not see or could not have seen the event
to which the declaration relates; moreover, it is not impossible that at
7.Altkrug v. William Whitman Co., 185 App. Div. 744, 173 N. Y. Supp. 669 (Ist
Dep't gig).
8. Geo. W. Saunders Live Stock Commission Co. v. Kincaid, i68 S. W. 977 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914).

9.Lake Drainage Commissioners v. Spencer, i74 N. C. 36, 93 S. E. 435 (1917).
10. 5 WmIoaR, EVmFNCE § 1367.
ii. Dunbar, J, in State v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. 139 (1894).

Wigmore's

appraisal has often been quoted: "It (cross-examination) is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, EVDENCE
§ 1367.
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the time he made the declaration he had no reliable recollection of
what he had seen. Then too, there is grave danger either of outright
distortion or of incompleteness in such a second hand communication
of the declarant's recollection to the tribunal; and finally, he may have
been consciously lying.
On the other hand, non-assertive conduct,' 2 although its relevancy depends upon inferences from the conduct to the belief of the
actor to the fact believed, is obviously entitled to more favorable
appraisal than an assertive utterance. This is so because, by hypothesis, the actor by his conduct did not intend to express or convey an
idea. Thus, the actor's veracity (or lack of it) is without relevancy
to the trustworthiness of the evidence, and the lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the actor becomes definitely less significant. For example, as already noted, evidence of flight of a third party offered in
exculpation of the defendant in a criminal action has generally been
excluded,13 the courts in these cases having been content, without very
much discussion, to assimilate this conduct to an extra-judicial confession of the third party and thus to exclude it as "pure hearsay".
Yet, less superficial treatment of the problem makes it quite clear that
the flight evidence has considerably more to be said for it than the
out-of-court confession. The confession is assertive, intended by the
declarant to convey the idea of his guilt. Upon his veracity, therefore,
depends the trustworthiness of the confession. But in the case of
flight, nothing to the contrary appearing, it may safely be assumed
that the actor fled, not to express or convey the idea of his guilt, but
to escape detection and punishment. The conduct being non-assertive,
the actor's veracity is not involved in a rational appraisal of the trustworthiness of the evidence.
Or, take one of Wigmore's illustrations: "If, on looking out of
the window of a comfortable home, the persons on the highway are
12. Non-verbal conduct may, of course, be assertive in character. It will be so
where it is consciously intended by the actor to express or convey an idea, as, for example, the sign language of the dumb or the pointing out of a person, place or thing
for the purpose of identification. Then, too, there is probably always present the
theoretical possibility that conduct apparently non-assertive may have been intended by
the actor as assertive. For example, flight of a third person offered to be shown in
exculpation of the defendant in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily be assumed to be
non-assertive in character. Yet, there is present the possibility that it was intended by
the third person to be assertive, viz., to cast suspicion upon himself. But these are
unusual and exceptional situations and are intended to be excluded from the idea of
"hearsay conduct" dealt with in this discussion.
13. Goodlet v. State, 135 Ala. 39, 33 So. 892 (i9o3) ; Kemp v. State, 89 Ala. 52,
7 So. 413 (i8go) ; Owensby v. State, 82 Ala. 63, 2 So. 764 (1887) ; Levison v. State,
54 Ala. 52o (1875) ; Lindsey v. State, i8 Ala. App. 494, 93 So. 331 (1922) ; Terry v.
State, 13 Ala. App. 115, 69 So. 370 (i15); People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac. 65
(1924); State v. Menilla, 177 Iowa 283, 158 N. W. 645 (ii6); State v. Piernot, 167
Iowa 353, 149 N. W. 446 (914) ; State v. Jones, go N. C. 415 (1879) ; State v. White,
68 N. C. i58 (1872); State v. May, 15 N. C. 328 (833); Crookham v. State, 5 W.
Va. 510 (1871).
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observed to be shuddering and turning up their ulster-collars, a natural
inference is that the temperature without is extremely cold." 14 But
if proof of this circumstance were to be offered as evidence of the
temperature outside, it would be excluded under the orthodox rule as
"hearsay conduct", and it is extremely likely that the excluding court
would see a conclusive resemblance between the conduct and a statement by one of the persons on the highway that it was an extremely
cold day. But here again, it is plain that there is a palpable and substantial difference. The travelers upon the highway, neither by their
"shuddering" nor by "turning up their ulster-collars" are consciously
intending to express or convey an idea. The shuddering is no doubt
involuntary and a mere physical reaction, while the turning up of the
collars is for the sake of protection against the inclemency. No question of veracity is involved.
Bear in mind, then, the traditional rationalization of the hearsay
rule that assertions offered testimonially are not sufficiently trustworthy to be fit to be considered by the tribunal unless and until they
have been put to the fire of cross-examination, so that error arising
"from a corrupt desire and intention to pervert the truth", as well as
from deficiencies in observation, recollection and expression, may be
exposed. Thus, there appears to be sufficient justification to have
treated non-assertive conduct considerably more leniently than an
assertive utterance. The judicial treatment of the problem might easily
have taken such a course, even to the point of treating its non-assertiveness as sufficient to generally admit evidence of such conduct, where
it fairly appears that the actor had opportunity to observe and nothing
affirmatively appears to cast substantial doubt upon his recollection.
Had it done so one would probably not now consider such treatment at
all irrational.
It is, therefore, not a little remarkable that an examination of the
cases dealing with non-assertive conduct as hearsay fails to disclose
a single instance where a court has noticed this quality of "non-assertiveness" and its significance. 15
14. 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. I94O) § 459.
15. In addition to the "flight" cases (see note 13 supra) and the "silence" cases
(which are hereafter epitomized in the text), the cases examined follow, chronologically: Wright v. Tatham, 7 A. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. R. 488 (Ex. 1837), aff'd, 5 Cl.
& Fin. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. R. 559 (H. L. 1838) (on an issue of sanity, evidence of sending of letters, about matters of consequence, to testator, held inadmissible) ; Backhouse
v. Jones, 6 Bing. N. C. 65, 133 Eng. Rep. R. 26 (x839) (on an issue of the commission of prior acts of bankruptcy, evidence that certain creditors of the bankrupt delivered up to the assignees goods received from the bankrupt before the fiat held
inadmissible); Gresham Hotel Co. v. Manning, I Ir. R. C. L. 125 (1867) (in the trial
of an action for obstruction of light to the windows of plaintiff's hotel, evidence that
since defendant raised his building several persons about to take rooms in the hotel objected to the insufficiency of the light and, on that ground, refused to take the rooms
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This lack of judicial discrimination is particularly surprising in
view of the fact that the point has been made by a number of eminent
commentators. Wigmore, in discussing the applicability of the hearsay
rule to non-assertive conduct, had this to say as early as 19o4: "A
possible objection is found in the hearsay rule, i. e. in looking to a
person's conduct as evidencing the material cause of the conduct, are
we not virtually receiving the person's hearsay assertion as to the
cause? The hearsay rule excludes extra-judicial assertions only, i. e.
deliberate utterances in terms affirming a fact . . .; and, although
in effect an inference from conduct may be the same in result as an
inference from assertion, nevertheless, the two are distinct. Nor does
the policy or spirit of the hearsay rule apply; for that policy is to
test the assertions of persons regarded as witnesses, by learning the
source of their knowledge and by exposing its elements of weakness
and error, if possible; and where the evidence is not dealing with a
person's assertion as deriving force from his personal character, knowledge, or experience, it is not within the scope of the policy of the
hearsay rule. No doubt the line is sometimes hard to draw between
conduct used as circumstantial evidence and assertion used testimoheld inadmissible hearsay); Thompson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., ii App. Div. 182, 42
N. Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't 1896) (on an issue whether plaintiff suffered an injury to
the spine, evidence that her physician treated her for spinal injuries held inadmissible
as hearsay); In re Hine, 68 Conn. 551, 37 AtI. 384 (1897) (on an issue of sanity,
evidence that boys in the neighborhood made fun of the testatrLx held inadmissible as
(prosecution for
hearsay) ; Stallings v. State, 29 Tex. App. 2o, 63 S.W. 127 (9o)
embezzlement; evidence that creditors of prosecuting witness made claim for payment,
after defendant had justified his failure to remit by stating that he had paid these creditors, held inadmissible as hearsay); Wells v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 451, 67 S. W. 1020
(19o2) (evidence that husband of rape victim assaulted accused inadmissible when
offered to show husband believed defendant was assailant) ; Brittain v. State, 52 Tex.
Cr. 169, IO5 S. W. 817 (1907) (evidence that third person picked out marked money
which had been stolen from a large lot held hearsay) ; Murray v. State, 56 Tex. Cr.
438, 120 S. W. 437 (9o9) (liquor prosecution; evidence that "on a certain occasion,
the ladies called on the defendant and asked him to quit selling 'frosty'" held inadmissible as hearsay, id. at 439, 12o S. W. at 438) ; In re De Laveaga's Estate, x65 Cal.
6o7, 133 Pac. 307 (913)

(evidence of the manner in which a person whose sanity is in

question was treated by his family, without evidence of the conduct of the alleged
insane person under such treatment, held inadmissible as hearsay) ; Gillespie v. State,
73 Tex. Cr. 585, 166 S. W. 135 (94) (on an issue of prior chastity in a seduction
case, it appearing that on one occasion 0 was seen in prosecutrix's company, evidence
that on the next day he requested those who saw him with her not to say anything
about it held inadmissible hearsay) ; State v. Menilla, 177 Iowa 283, 158 N. W. 645
(1916) (refusal to instruct that if jury believed one T, shortly after the killing, had a
revolver and cartridges, concealed them and thereafter denied that he had had them,
these facts might be considered in determining who fired the fatal shots, held reversible
error, though in-the same case it was also held that evidence of flight was inadmissible
hearsay; the rulings are obviously inconsistent) ; Pitner v. Shugart Bros., 15o Ga. 34o,
1o3 S.E. 791 (1920) (on an issue of whether the operation of a cotton gin near a dwelling was a nuisance, evidence of increase in fire insurance rates held. inadmissible; it is
to be noted, however, that the conduct was apparently proposed to be evidenced by
hearsay, viz., the out-of-court statement of an insurance agent) ; Ray v. State, 88 Tex.
Cr. 196, 225 S.W. 523 (1920) (it appeared that defendant, a witness in his own behalf,
had been indicted for, though acquitted of, theft from an express company; evidence
that the express company compromised his claim for malicious prosecution held inad532, 133 N. E. 201 (1921) (evidence that
missible as hearsay) ; People v. Bush, 300 Ill.
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nially. Nevertheless, the difference is a real one...
." 16 Seligman's
comment in 1912 was penetrating and persuasive: "Can utterances
alone be hearsay, and can all utterances be hearsay? As to the first
part of this question, it is clear that non-verbal conduct might well

be excluded; for example, waving a signal-flag or talking in signlanguage is really one form of speech.

On the other hand, some

an inmate of an institution, after a Wassermann test, was not segregated, offered in
proof that the inmate did not have syphilis held inadmissible as hearsay) ; Powell v.
State, 88 Tex. Cr. 367, 227 S. W. 188 (1921) (in prosecution of defendant, charged
with theft of his grandmother's cow which he admittedly sold, his defense being that
she had authorized him to sell the cow, evidence that on her return home she demanded
the cow and not the money from the purchaser held inadmissible as hearsay) ; Hanson
v. State, i6o Ark. 329, 254 S. W. 691 (1923) (on an issue of whether a bank was in
a failing condition, evidence that another bank directed its agent to accept nothing but
cash in payment of a draft held inadmissible as hearsay); Carpenter v. Asheville
Power & Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400 (1926) (on an issue as to damages
in a wrongful death action, evidence of offer to deceased of employment with substantial salary held inadmissible as hearsay) ; McCurdy v. Flibotte, 83 N. H. 143, 139 At.
367 (1927) (in an automobile accident case evidence that the license of one of the
drivers had been revoked for reckless driving in connection with the accident in question held inadmissible as hearsay) ; Daly v. Publix Cars, 128 Neb. 403, 259 N. W. 163
(1935) (evidence that the driver of the automobile which collided with taxicab paid
damages done to cab held inadmissible hearsay in action by taxicab passenger against
the owners of both cars) ; Fitch v. Bemis, 107 Vt. 165, 177 Atl. 193 (1935) (in an
automobile collision case, evidence that immediately after the accident a motor vehicle
inspector arrested plaintiff on charges of driving while drunk and reckless driving held
inadmissible as hearsay; the court indicated, however, that had it appeared that the
officer had been present at the scene when the accident occurred and had acted under
the influence of the "exciting occasion", his conduct, like an assertion, might have
been admissible as a spontaneous exclamation); United States v. Sessin, 84 F. (2d)
667 (C. C. A. ioth, 1936) (in an action on a war risk policy, plaintiff's testimony that
he was transferred to a tuberculosis ward in an army hospital held properly admitted,
presumably in proof of his tubercular condition; the court declared:

".

. . his testi-

mony was direct and not hearsay. . . . If plaintiff's trip to this ward was not as a
tubercular patient, cross-examination would have neutralized any inference drawn from
the question." Id. at 669); Atlantic Co. v. Farris, 8 S. E. (2d) 665 (Ga. App. i94o)
(on an issue of whether certain furniture belonged to plaintiff or plaintiff's husband,
evidence that plaintiff's husband's landlord had levied a distress warrant on the furniture in an effort to collect rent due from the husband held inadmissible as hearsay).
i6. 2 WIGMORE, EvmEcCE (3d ed. 1940) § 459. But, strangely enough, Wigmore,
at another point in his treatise (Id. at § 267), in dealing somewhat more precisely with
the problem in hand, makes no mention of this quality of non-assertiveness: "What,
then, are the objections to [conduct, where relevancy depends on inferences from the
conduct to belief to the fact believed] ? Plainly, that it is practically often equivalent
to the inference from testimonial evidence, and that therefore we should be violating
the Hearsay rule by accepting an extra-judicial assertion as evidence of the fact asserted. For example, on an issue of the existence of a lost will, suppose the fact to be
offered that the deceased on his deathbed told his daughter, 'My will is in the iron
chest;' or, on an issue of legitimacy, suppose the fact to be offered that the parents
always treated the child as their own. In these instances suppose it is to be argued that
the deceased's utterance indicates circumstantially his belief in the will's existence,
and that his belief in turn indicates the fact of the will's existence; or that the parents'
conduct leads to the inference that they believed the child to have been born to them
after marriage, and that this belief evidences the fact of such birth. Such a double circumstantial inference is in theory perfectly possible and proper. But, after all, is not
the process practically equivalent to accepting the deceased's declaration and the parents'
conduct in a purely assertive and testimonial fashion, i. e., to admitting directly their
assertions about the will and the child, precisely as if they were on the stand and credit
were asked for their testimonial assertions to that effect? And if such evidence were
allowed to come in as circumstantial, could not any and every hearsay statement be
brought in upon the same plea, by resolving it into a double inference, namely, by
translating A's assertion, that he saw M strike N, into an inference from his utterance
to his belief and from his belief to the fact asserted? Short of such an extreme deduc-
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human conduct is clearly admissible; for example, the flight of an
accused may be shown to prove his guilt. What is the distinction? In
each case the conduct is used to evidence a belief in order to prove
the fact believed, and so in each case there seems to be a possibility
of the same three defects (first, inaccurate perception; second, faulty
memory; third, untruthfulness) which are usually present in hearsay.
Yet there is a difference, which lies in this: in the first example the
conduct was intended to convey thought, in the second it was not.
When there is no intention to communicate to any one there is very
much less chance that the act was done in order to deceive, and hence
the third and fundamental danger in admitting hearsay does not here
exist, or at least not so strongly.

.

.

. Accordingly, there appears

to be a sound distinction between the cases, which may be formulated
in the statement that only conduct apparently intended to convey
thought can come under the ban of the hearsay rule. It is to be noted
that the test employed is apparent intent, for it is obviously impossible
to apply an internal standard in this connection." 17 The significance
of the quality of non-assertiveness was emphasized again by McCormick in 1930 l and by Morgan in 1935 19 and in 1937.20

"Thus,"

says Morgan, "if, after a crime has been committed, X flees under
suspicious circumstances, intending thereby to express the proposition
that he is guilty or that he believes himself guilty, and evidence of the
flight is offered as tending to show his guilt, it is hearsay. Usually, if
. but what if X flees
he intends this, it will be to protect another .
tion, it seems at first sight impossible to stop.

It is plain enough that the settled

analogies in the rules of circumstantial inference, as well as the modes of reasoning in
every-day affairs, justify us in claiming that the inference from conduct to belief and
from belief to the fact believed is, in theory at least, a legitimate one. Yet, on the
other hand there is force in the argument that the pretended double inference of a circumstantial sort is equivalent to giving credit to a testimonial assertion, and involves
therefore a danger of evasion of the Hearsay rule." Then, after noting a few fairly
well recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule, he continues: "Whatever remains,
then, in the way of conduct-evidence as supporting an inference of the person's belief
and thus of the fact believed, is in general, apart from the two preceding groups,
declared inadmissible, as being too open to construction as assertions and therefore as
mere hearsay. The reasoning on which this result is reached is sufficiently set forth
in the passages from Wright v. Tatham, above quoted. The language of those opinions ignores, to be sure, the well-settled exceptions of the first group (a) just summarized; but, apart from these allowances, it fairly represents the general attitude of
the law. Whatever instances of opposite tendency may be noted in the following sections, and however well-founded these may be in a given case, they must be regarded
as casual and unusual."
In this section Wigmore appears to take the position that it is logically impossible,
as far as the application of the Hearsay rule is concerned, to avoid placing non-assertive
conduct and assertive utterance in the same category. But the very quality of nonassertiveness, it is submitted, offers a substantial basis for discrimination, as Wigmore
himself forcibly suggests in § 459, quoted in the text.
17. Seligman, note 4 supra at 148, 149.
x8. McCormiclc, note 4 supra.
xg. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. i138.
2o. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule (1937) 12 WAsH. L. RE. I, 7.
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not for that purpose, but solely for the purpose of escape? . .
Since by hypothesis X did not express the proposition of his guilt or
his belief in his guilt, his veracity is in no way involved." 21
But notwithstanding what appears to be a quite obvious difference in trustworthiness between non-assertive conduct and an assertive utterance and the emphasis upon this difference by these commentators, the courts, as has been said, have found no difficulty in
assimilating conduct to assertion and in thus excluding instances of
in the
such conduct as "hearsay evidence, mere statements, expressed
22
language of conduct instead of the language of words".
"Proof of a particular fact," said Baron Parke in Wright v. Tatham "which is not of itself a matter in issue, but which is relevant
only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person on the matter
in issue, is inadmissible in all cases where such a statement or opinion
not on oath would be of itself inadmissible; and therefore, in this case
the letters which are offered only to prove the competence of the testator, that is, the truth of the implied statements therein contained,
were properly rejected, as the mere statement or opinion of the writer
would certainly have been inadmissible." 23
In Thompson v. Manhattan Ry.2 4 the issue was whether plaintiff
had sustained a spinal injury in an accident; the trial court admitted
evidence that her attending physician had treated her for an injury to
the spine; in holding the admission of this evidence reversible error,
the New York court said: "We think such proof was in the nature
of hearsay. The treatment of the plaintiff for a particular disease
was no more than a declaration of the physician that she was suffering from such a disease."
In State v. Piernot25 the trial court refused to instruct that the
flight of one T "should be considered as substantive testimony bearing upon the defendant's guilt"; this was not error, held the Iowa
court, because "flight, if proved, is nothing more than a confession
by another, and the defendant was not entitled to the use of this testimony in his own defense."
And in George W. Saunders Live Stock Commission Co. v. Kincaid 26 on an issue as to the soundness of some hogs, the seller proposed to testify that he had received no complaints from customers
who purchased other hogs from the same shipment. The Texas court
21. Ibid.
22. I TAYLOR, EVlDaNCE (8th ed. 1885)

§ 571.
23. 7 A. & E. 313, 388, 112 Eng. Rep. R. 488, 516 (Ex. 1837).

24. II App. Div. 182, 42 N. Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't 1896).
25. 167 Iowa 353, 149 N. W. 446 (1914).
26. 168 S. W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
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affirmed the exclusion of this testimony. Said the court: "That complaint was or was not made would appear to be pure hearsay."
It is without doubt a debatable question whether this quality of
non-assertiveness (which effectually forecloses the danger of untruthfulness which attaches to the ordinary hearsay statement) should be
held sufficiently substantial in itself to override the other truly hearsay attributes of extra-judicial conduct, where relevancy depends upon
inferences from the conduct to belief to the fact believed. At the
least, however, this quality of non-assertiveness is entitled to judicial
discussion and evaluation. Receiving such, it is quite possible that
evidence of such conduct would be given somewhat more lenient treatment.
Of course, though the actor's impaired or deficient veracity is not
involved in a rational determination of the reliability of evidence of
non-assertive conduct, there is the possibility of deficiencies in other
respects which cross-examination might expose. Thus, the actor may
not have observed, perhaps did not have the opportunity to observe
the event, the belief in the existence or character of which his conduct
seems to vouch. There is, too, the possibility of deficiency in the
quality of the actor's recollection at the time of the conduct in question, although it should be stated that it is quite difficult to conceive
of more than a remote possibility of significantly deficient recollection
in respect to the instances of non-assertive conduct which have been
treated as hearsay in the reported cases. Since, by hypothesis, the
actor vouched his belief in conduct rather than in language, the danger of inaccurate or incomplete narration or expression, the possibility
of which is always present in respect to the usual hearsay assertion,
appears to be absent. Still, as Morgan has suggested, "there is .
a danger that an improper deduction will be drawn from (such) conduct. Though there is no more danger of a wrong deduction here
than in other cases of circumstantial evidence." 27
What, then, should be the answer when an objection invoking
the hearsay rule is made to evidence of non-assertive conduct? Ought
the quality of non-assertiveness be held sufficient to outweigh the danger of possible deficiencies in observation and recollection? It seems
rather clear that no hard and fast rule would be rational. In each
case, the answer should depend-on what? McCormick and Morgan
have both suggested solutions.
McCormick, in 193o, rounded out his discussion of the orthodox
rule excluding evidence of non-assertive conduct by concluding that
the inflexible operation of the rule excluded "evidence which has the
27. Morgan, note 20 supra.
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strongest circumstantial guaranties of reliability". "It is true," he
said, "that very much of such conduct-evidence, if admitted, would
be of trivial value and probably a general inclusionary rule that all
such evidence is admissible wherever the actor's testimony on the stand
would be, would be only one degree better than wholesale exclusion.
Consequently, it would seem sensible to conclude that conduct (other
than assertions) when offered to show the actor's beliefs and hence
the truth of the facts so believed, being merely analogous to and not
identical with typical hearsay, ought to be admissible whenever the
trial judge, in his discretion, finds that the action so vouched the
belief as to give reasonable assurance of trustworthiness." 28
McCormick did not elaborate this conclusion, which, it will be
observed, is phrased in very general terms; as a matter of fact, his article concludes with the quoted sentence. While he did not undertake to
particularize as to the sort of "action" which, in his judgment, would
"give reasonable assurance of trustworthiness", it would seem that to
give such assurance the "action" necessarily must be of significance or
importance to the actor.
The tenor of McCormick's discussion (particularly his emphasis
on Pitt Taylor's observation that belief vouched "by acts done in confirmation of their sincerity" are, morally speaking, entitled to great
weight) appears to justify such an interpretation. If not so justified,
then, with deference, it is here proposed that McCormick's suggested
criterion should be qualified accordingly. And, in the subsequent dis28. McCormick, note 4 supra at 504.
The greater probative force of a belief vouched by important conduct than of a belief
merely expressed in words, was an argument pressed in Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin.
670, 7 Eng. Rep. R. 559 (H. L. 1838), though, of course, this consideration did not prevail against what the court considered compelling reasons for exclusion. Mr. Justice
Coleridge: "Suppose, says [learned counsel] his fellow townsmen had elected Mr. Marsden [the testator] to be their representative in Parliament, might I not prove that fact
as evidence of their opinion of his competency? . . . I distinctly answer, no ...
The mere word of a man of character, the mere opinion of a man of experience and
prudence where by some act he vouches its sincerity, will naturally and properly influence our opinions; but the law of England requires the sanction of an oath to that
which is to influence the verdict of a jury." Baron Parke: "Nor is the evidence [the
writing by third persons of letters to the testator about matters of consequence] the
more admissible because the persons writing the letters do not merely express an opinion in writing, but prove their belief of it by acting upon it to the extent of sending the
letters and putting them in the course of reaching the person addressed. . . . If the
opinion of a person be of itself inadmissible, the act which only proves the belief of
that person in its truth, and is irrelevant to the issue, except for that purpose, cannot
render it admissible."
Pitt Taylor does not seem to have been entirely convinced: "In most of the instances given above, as illustrating the occasional inconvenience of the rule, the evidence
rejected amounted to something more than the mere declarations of parties not examined on oath, nor subjected to cross-examination; for these declarations were accompanied by acts done in confirmation of their sincerity, and as such, the evidence was,
morally speaking, entitled to great weight. The law, however, wvill not on this account
allow any exception to be made in favor of hearsay ...
I" TAYLot, EVIDENCE (8th
ed. i885) § 572.
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cussion of his proposal, such interpretation or qualification, whichever
it is, will be assumed.
The argument, then, is that if the actor was sufficiently satisfied
with his observation and recollection of the relevant event or condition
to predicate action important to himself upon his belief in that event
or condition, there is enough to be said for the trustworthiness of his
belief, though uncross-examined, to permit it to be presented to the
tribunal as a basis of a possible inference to the event or condition. In
suggesting this criterion, McCormick undoubtedly assumed that before
evidence of any instance of conduct would be admitted, it must appear
that the actor either observed or had the opportunity to observe the relevant event or condition, and further, that nothing affirmatively appears
casting substantial doubt upon the quality of his recollection. On this
basis, his suggestion is very appealing. In admitting this type of evidence, it would take account of a palpable distinction between nonassertive conduct and an assertive utterance, in respect to untrustworthiness due to impaired veracity; in circumscribing admission, it would
take account of a palpable distinction between belief vouched by important and merely by trivial conduct, in respect to untrustworthiness due
to deficiencies in observation and recollection. Moreover, the proposal
would achieve flexibility, a result ardently to be desired not only in
29
this, but in many areas of the law of evidence.
Morgan in 1935 suggested in great detail, criteria for the judicial
handling of evidence of conduct. After proposing that hearsay be de29. "It is clear that the drift is from rules of exclusion mandatory on the judge,

to rules expressed in terms of discretionary balancing of considerations. Undoubtedly
there are advantages in definite rules. The lawyer in preparing his proofs has a fairly
certain guide as to what will be admitted. But definite rules tend to crystallize in
sharp restrictions based on past situations, and these restrictions, when applied in other
cases, result in excluding evidence which would be useful. In some fields of evidence,
the discretionary treatment has long been recognized as essential. . : . Even the important safe-guarding rules must soon be restated in more flexible terms. Chief of
these, the great characteristic feature of the common law of evidence, is the group of
rules requiring that testimony be limited to statements in court of witnesses who observed the facts at first hand, and are produced for cross-examination. This demand
for the best, reduced to a rule, voices a high ideal, but manifestly one that in the everyday world must constantly be compromised. First-hand observers die and move away;
their letters and declarations must be accepted as second-best. When will the secondbest be good enough? It now seems strange that the courts should have attempted to
answer this by defining in sharp categories the special situations when the secondary
proof would be allowed. But the urge for certainty prevailed, and the particular situations where the second-hand evidence seemed most needed in the first half of the
eighteen hundreds, as for example, dying declarations and book-entries, were crystallized into exceptions to the hearsay rule. These now number from ten to twenty, depending on the minuteness of the classification. Of course, they were improvisations
intended to be played by ear, but they fail of that purpose because the classes are grown
so many and the boundaries so meandering that no one can carry any large part of this
hearsay-exception--learning in his head. Moreover, the values of hearsay declarations
or writings, and the need for them, in particular situations cannot with any degree of
realism be thus minutely ticketed in advance. . . .
Too much worthless evidence
will fit the categories; too much that is vitally needed will be left out. A broader and
more practical method will be developed." McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence
(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 507, 511.
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fined so as to include non-assertive conduct, where relevancy depends
upon inferences from the conduct to the belief of the actor to the fact
believed, he suggested the recognition of an exception to the hearsay
rule which would accommodate evidence of such conduct "if the trial
judge first finds
(i) that the event or condition consisted of the person's own
behavior or condition of which he was then conscious, or
(2) that (a) the event or condition was within the person's
knowledge, and
(b) his conduct offered to evidence the event or condition was
a detriment to him, and
(c) it would have been useless for him to undergo that detriment if the event had not happened or the condition had not
existed." 30

In respect to non-assertive conduct qualifying under clause (i) of
this "exception", Morgan appears to have advocated somewhat more
lenient treatment than McCormick; in respect to non-assertive conduct
which cannot so qualify, the proposal is definitely more conservative
than McCormick's.
Under clause (i) evidence of non-assertive conduct would be
admitted in all cases where the ultimately relevant event or condition
("the fact believed") consists of the actor's "own behavior or condition
of which he was then conscious". Thus, flight of a third person (it
appearing to the trial judge to have been non-assertive), offered in
exculpation of the defendant in a criminal action, being ultimately relevant to the prior behavior of the actor (the proposed inferences being
from the flight to his belief in his guilt to his guilt) would clearly qualify under the clause. 3 1 In the case of non-assertive conduct generally,
Morgan said, "the chief perils lie in unconscious self-deception of (the
actor) as to his perception and memory. If the external event ("the
fact believed") is (the actor's) own behavior, these perils are reduced
to a minimum," 32 since the actor "is not likely to make innocent mistakes in the perception of his own behavior or in his memory of it". s3
This is true, of course, if the conduct is consequential enough to the
actor to reliably evidence his belief, i. e. the accurate and complete recol30. Morgan, note ig supra at ii59.
3. The application of clause (i) of Morgan's proposed exception to evidence of
conduct like that admitted in Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash. 462, 85 P. (2d) 1095

(1938), cited note 5 supra, would present an interesting question. There the ultimately
relevant event ("the fact believed") was the making of a contract, i. e., the prior joint
behavior of the actor and another.
32. Morgan, note i9 supraat li5o.
33. Id. at 11_4.
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lection of his prior behavior. And in the case of "flight", the conduct
plainly is of that character. So that under the first clause of Morgan's
exception, evidence of flight would receive the same treatment as would
be accorded by McCormick. But the rule would admit evidence of all
non-assertive conduct where "the fact believed" consists of the actor's
own prior behavior or condition, regardless of the importance of that
conduct to the actor. It is suggested that such a rule overlooks the value
if not the practical necessity of that sanction or avouchment represented
by the quality of importance. Without such guarantee, it is not clear
that the mere circumstance that the ultimately relevant fact consists of
the actor's own prior behavior, furnishes much assurance of trustworthiness of the actor's apparent belief in respect to such prior
behavior. It is in this respect that the first clause of Morgan's exception seems to propose somewhat more lenient treatment than does
McCormick's suggestion.
If the conduct-evidence which has been condemned as hearsay in
the past is a fair indication of the sort of conduct-evidence which will
be proffered in the future, it is apparent from the reported cases that
the first clause of Morgan's exception would accommodate but a fraction thereof. Evidence of flight, to be sure, falls within the category;
but it is difficult to identify in the cases other instances of conduct
which would be included. Consequently, clause (2), dealing with nonassertive conduct ultimately relevant to an event or condition other than
the prior behavior of the actor, appears to be of considerably more
significance.
This second clause, as has been said, represents a far more conservative departure from the existing rule than does McCormick's
proposal. It will not be enough that the conduct be important to the
actor; it must further possess a detrimental or disserving quality; not
only that, it must appear that the conduct would have been "useless"
but for the event or condition to the proof of which the conduct is
relevant.
But in 1937 Morgan proposed much more radical treatment. He
said: "When a court analyzes non-assertory, non-verbal conduct as
hearsay, it ought then to examine all the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule to ascertain whether the hearsay in question does not fall
within one of them. If no apt exception is found, it ought then to ascertain whether the dangers of error in perception or memory which might
be eliminated by cross-examination are so substantial as to call for its
exclusion. If not, the evidence should be received for, by hypothesis,
neither veracity nor narration is involved." .4 This assumes perhaps
34. Morgan, note 20 smpra at IO.
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that, in determining whether danger of error in perception or memory
is substantial, rational treatment by the trial court would require consideration of the significance of the conduct to the actor and of its selfserving or disserving character. Consequently, it is possible that
Morgan's later proposal does not imply as radical a departure as at
first appears. Yet, the fact remains that in his second proposal the
admissibility of the evidence is not to be expressly conditioned either
upon the importance or detrimental character of the conduct.
It seems to the writer that, as proper treatment for non-assertive
conduct in general, McCormick's suggestion represents the most desirable solution. In requiring that the conduct be of such a sort "as to
give reasonable assurance of trustworthiness", interpreted here to mean
that it must be of substantial importance to the actor in his own affairs,
the proposal would exclude evidence of mere casual, unimportant or
frivolous conduct. This would be a wise restriction. In so far as
dangers in observation or recollection are concerned, there is probably
nothing to choose between a belief vouched only by unimportant or
casual conduct and a belief merely put in words. It is only when the
conduct is of some genuine significance or importance to the actor that
it can rationally be said that there is a likelihood of greater trustworthiness than in the case of the hearsay utterance. Taking Morgan's later
suggestion at its face value, it is conceivable, for instance, that, a trial
judge applying it would feel justified, on an issue involving the mental
competency of a testatrix, in admitting evidence that "the boys (in the
neighborhood) used to make fun of her",3 5 if it fairly appeared that
the boys had personal knowledge of her behavior and the doctrine of
the particular jurisdiction permitted lay opinion testimony on the point.
Yet, it seems clear that there is just as much danger of deficiency in
observation and recollection in the use of trivial conduct-of this character as in the case of a hearsay assertion. The belief of the actor lacks
that strong, avouchment which, for example, is so apparent in "the
conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthiness, who, after
examining every part of the vessel, embarked in it with his family".3 6
On the other hand, the requirement of Morgan's original proposal
that the conduct (where the "fact believed" is other than the actor's
own prior behavior or condition) must have been detrimental to the
actor, appears difficult to justify. As has already been noted, Morgan,
in his later suggestion, does not condition the admissibility of the evidence upon a preliminary finding of "detriment". If the actor had
sufficient confidence in the quality of his observation and recollection
35. In re Hine, 68 Conn. 551, 37 AtI. 384 (x897).
36. Baron Parke in Wright v. Tatham, 7 A. & E. 313, 386, 112 Eng. Rep. R. 488,

515 (Ex. 1837).
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and in his resulting belief in the existence of the ultimately relevant
event or condition, to predicate upon that belief action of substantial
importance to himself, this sanction would appear to be substantial
enough to admit the conduct evidence.
A "detrimental" quality would, as in the case of assertions against
interest, potently negative untrustworthiness due to untruthfulness; but
the conduct being, by hypothesis, non-assertive, the actor's veracity is
not involved. And, assuming that the conduct was of importance to
the actor, it is difficult to see how a detrimental quality would add much
if anything to trustworthiness, in respect to the actor's observation and
recollection. However that may be, a requirement of detriment, over
and above a requirement of importance, does not appear to be
demanded.
These theoretical conclusions find support in the obvious undesirability of result when the detriment requirement is applied concretely.
Thus, the conduct of plaintiff's attending physician in treating plaintiff
for a spinal injury 37 would seem to amount to a sufficient avouchment
of the physician's belief to admit evidence of the treatment as proof
of the existence of a spinal injury. Sufficient sanction would seem to
exist also in the conduct of the authorities of a home for delinquents
in placing an inmate in a non-venereal ward, after a Wassermann test,
when offered to be shown in proof that the inmate was not afflicted
In each of these cases the conduct-evidence was
with syphilis."
excluded as hearsay. Such evidence must continue to be excluded
under any modification of the existing rule which insists upon a
preliminary finding of "detriment", because in neither of these cases
was the conduct in any sense detrimental or disserving to the actor.
Yet these cases seem to typify the very sort of non-assertive conduct
which, strongly vouching the actor's belief so as to give "reasonable
assurance of trustworthiness", is entitled rationally to more sympathetic
treatment than a hearsay assertion. The same may be said of evidence,
on an issue of sanity, that the testator's "fellow townsmen had elected
(him) to be their representative in Parliament". Here again, because
the conduct is of significance to the actors and because, consequently,
"it is morally convincing" and "will naturally and properly influence
our opinions", 39 it ought to be admitted under a rational relaxation
of the existing rule. Yet such conduct could not be said to be
"detrimental".
37. Thompson v. Manhattan Railway Co., ii App. Div. 182, 42 N. Y. Supp. 896

(2d Dep't 1896).
38. People v. Bush, 3oo Ill.
532, 133 N. E. 2o (i92i).
39. Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. R. 559 (H. L. 1838).
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Except for a number of those treating of "silence", in practically
none of the reported cases excluding evidence of non-assertive conduct
as hearsay was the conduct in question disserving. 40 It follows, consequently, that, as a practical matter, any relaxation of the existing rule
which would require a showing of "detriment" preliminary to admission would be of very limited significance. But this idea of detriment
cannot be entirely dismissed. It will be found serviceable when we
come to deal specifically with "silence" as hearsay.
Perhaps what has been said makes it reasonable to conclude that
Morgan's first proposal would too greatly restrict and his later one too
freely permit, the admission of evidence of non-assertive conduct.
Avoiding these extremes, McCormick's proposal, as here interpreted,
consequently seems preferable.
Whether, if the rule were to be relaxed, admissible non-assertive
conduct should be considered as non-hearsay or as hearsay exceptionally
admitted is a matter of no practical consequence. However, because,
even though non-assertive, such conduct is burdened with some of the
dangers of pure hearsay, and because under all the proposals which
have been made, and under McCormick's in particular, not all, but only
some non-assertive conduct would be admitted, it would appear logical,
in the first instance, to treat it all as hearsay.
First, then, hearsay should be defined so as to include not only
utterances but non-assertive conduct where relevancy depends upon
inferences from the conduct to the belief of the actor to the fact
believed.
However, in accordance with McCormick's suggestion
(amplified and interpreted somewhat), evidence of such non-assertive
conduct should be exceptionally admitted if, but only if, the trial judge
first finds that (a) the actor had personal knowledge of the fact (i. e.
the occurrence of the event or the existence of the condition) to the
proof of which the evidence is offered; more precisely, that it fairly
4o. As a matter of fact, one finds it difficult to appraise as "detrimental" the conduct excluded in any of the reported cases. However, this circumstance must, in a
measure, be fortuitous, because it is not difficult to imagine cases where the conduct is
plainly enough detrimental or disserving to the actor, e. g., two of the hypothetical
illustrations considered by the court in Wright v. Tatham, 7 A. & E. 313, 343, 387, 112
Eng. Rep. R. 488, 5oo, 516 (Ex. x837) : Suppose an issue arises respecting the loss of
insured property, would the fact of payment by other underwriters be admissible? Furthermore "suppose a third person had betted a wager with [the testator] that he could not
solve some mathematical problem, the solution of which required a high degree of capacity; would payfnent of that wager to [the testator's] bank be admissible evidence that
he possessed that capacity"?
McCormick has suggested an example where the detrimental quality is apparent:
Suppose that "on an issue (in a suit between third parties) of whether at a certain
time A was indebted in a certain sum to B, evidence is offered that A paid the amount
of the alleged debt to B". McCoRMICK, note 4 supra at 497.
As the text implies, "silence", consisting of the failure of the buyer of goods to
complain as to quality or the failure of one involved in an accident to complain of injury, seems clearly conduct of a detrimental or disserving sort. Cases dealing with
such conduct are noted later.
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appears that the actor observed or had the opportunity to observe such
event or condition and that nothing appears to cast substantial doubt
upon the quality of his recollection at the time of the conduct; and (b)
that the conduct was important or significant to the actor in his
affairs and so vouched his belief "as to give reasonable assurance of
trustworthiness".
As applicable to non-assertive conduct in general, the adoption of
the foregoing suggestion, relieving as it would against the inflexible
and undiscriminating operation of the orthodox exclusionary rule,
would represent a rational and feasible solution. However, as applied
to "silence", and perhaps to negative conduct generally, it is believed,
as will be pointed out later on, that some modification of the formula is
necessary.
The "silence" cases (those treating of silence as hearsay) fall
easily into two groups:
(i) those concerned with the admissibility of evidence of the
failure of the buyer of goods to complain, on an issue of quality; or of
the failure of one who might have been injured in an alleged accident
to give notice of or make claim for injury, on an issue as to the
occurrence or severity of the accident; and
(2) those concerned with the admissibility of evidence of the failure of one alleged to have made an agreement, executed an instrument
or to have been served with process, to mention the disputed act or event
to his family or associates, on an issue as to the occurrence of that act
or event.
The cases are few, and consequently it is feasible to make some
reference to each of them. Preliminarily, it ought to be said that in
none of the cases do we find anything like an adequate discussion of the
problem presented . 4 In none is apt authority cited, and in nearly all,
the result rests on nothing more than the ipse dixit of the court that the
evidence is or is not hearsay. In a very few of the cases the court has
extended itself to the point of assimilating the failure to speak to an
assertion of the belief evidenced thereby. And as has already been said,
in no case has a court noticed the quality of non-assertiveness and its
significance.
In the first group, St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain
Co. 42 was an action by the grain company against the railway company
41. The same may be said of the cases dealing with non-assertive conduct generally. As McCormick has observed (note 4 mspra at 502) since Wright v. Tatham
(1838) the decisions have given only "slight consideration!' to the foundation of the
orthodox rule.
42. 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S. W. 656 .(i9o6).
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for the conversion of a carload of corn of No. 2 quality. A witness
for plaintiff testified that the corn in question was a part of a lot of
6o,ooo pounds, that the balance had been sold to retail dealers in
Texarkana "as No. 2 corn", and "no complaint was ever made by any
of the purchasers of the same". The Texas court held that the admission of this evidence was not error, because: "The witness simply
stated a fact within his own knowledge; that he did sell it in the course
of trade as No. 2 corn, not at retail, but to retail dealers, and no complaint was ever made. These are facts and not declarations of third
persons." The court went on to observe, however, that the amount of
plaintiff's verdict indicated that the jury did not believe that the corn
was No. 2 corn. Any error in the admission of the testimony was consequently harmless, and this circumstance undoubtedly militates against
the persuasiveness, if not the authoritativeness of the appellate ruling.
In an action by the buyer of hogs to recover for the seller's misrepresentations of soundness, the same court rejected proposed testimony
that there had been no complaint by the packing companies who purchased hogs from the same shipment. Without referring to the St.
Louis S. W. Ry. case, the court said: "We do not think it would be
permissible merely to show that no complaint as to diseases among the
hogs had been made by the packing houses purchasing them. That
complaint was or was not made would appear to be pure hearsay. It
perhaps would be permissible to show by witnesses who knew the facts
that other hogs contained in the shipment with those in controversy
were or were not affected with disease, but this is altogether another
question." 43 Where a buyer sued for breach of warranty as to the
quality of woolens sold, the trial court allowed the defendant to show
that goods rejected by plaintiff were afterwards sold to other customers
"who made no complaint in reference thereto". The admission of this
evidence constituted reversible error, said the New York court, because
"this was clearly hearsay evidence as to the opinions of other customers
upon these goods. This evidence was most mischievous evidence, and
might well have been a controlling factor in the minds of the jury in
determining that the goods in question were up to sample."

44

And in

another case, where the same issue of quality was involved, the court
again held erroneous the admission of evidence of the resale of the
goods in question to non-complaining customers. It was felt that "the
fact that these other customers had made no complaint as to the quality
43. George W. Saunders Live Stock Commission Co. v. Kincaid, 168 S. W. 977
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
44. Altkrug v. William Whitman Co., 185 App. Div. 744, 173 N. Y. Supp. 669 (ist

Dep't igig).
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of these goods sold to them was purely hearsay evidence upon the
45
question of quality of these goods".
Sullivan v. Minneapolis Street Ry. 4" was an action by a passenger

on one of defendant's street cars to recover for personal injuries claimed
to have been sustained when the car made an emergency stop to avoid
colliding with a truck. Plaintiff testified that the car was crowded and
many passengers were standing, and that "because of the emergency
stop, all the passengers who were standing were just like one great mass
of humanity, just hurled right forward; they just went down headlong
into the center of the aisle; they (those holding straps) were torn right
loose from the straps and went right down with the rest of us; everyone
fell on top of each other." The conductor testified that no one was
thrown to the floor. Over plaintiff's objection, defendant's claim agent
was permitted to testify that no other claim was made upon defendant
arising out of the accident. The Minnesota court approved the admission of this testimony, though the hearsay question is not identified.
While the testimony, the court said, may have been remote and of little
weight, it was, nevertheless, admissible "in the discretion of the trial
court", because "it had a direct tendency to show that the statements
of a witness on one side were more reasonable and therefore more
credible than the statements of a witness on the other side". Though,
while admissible, the court continued, "such testimony obviously must
47
be received with caution". And in Fogg v. Oregon Short Line R. R.
plaintiff sought compensation for an injured knee. In support of its
claim that the knee had been injured in a prior accident, defendant
introduced a written statement by plaintiff to that effect. In rebuttal,
plaintiff's wife was permitted to testify that plaintiff had made no complaint of any injury to his knee in the prior accident. Affirming this
ruling on appeal, the Utah court said that the defendant had not furnished it with any citation of authority or argument showing why the
admission of this evidence was error. While the hearsay rule was
thus not expressly invoked, the appellate court undoubtedly had the
possibility of such an objection in mind, declaring that "declarations of
present pain and suffering are admissible as original evidence in all
inquiries where pain and suffering constitute the question involved
. we see no reason why the plaintiff should not be permitted to
show he had made no complaint of pain and suffering in his knee".
That is to say, even though the failure to complain be treated as hearsay, still evidence thereof will come in under the exception for declara45. James K. Thomson Co. v. International Compositions Co., Inc., 191 App. Div.

553, 181 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Ist Dep't 1920).
46. z6I Minn. 45, 2oo N. W. 922 (1924).
47. 78 Utah io5, i P. (2d) 954 (1931).
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tions of a presently existing mental or physical condition. 48 And this
seems sound because if a statement of presently existing pain, which, by
hypothesis, is assertive, is able to qualify against the hearsay rule, then
conduct (i. e. failure to complain) which presumably is non-assertive
and thus somewhat more trustworthy, ought likewise to be admitted.
In group 2, in a case where the issue was the service of a summons
upon the defendants' mother, the defendants were permitted by the
trial court to testify "that they never heard their mother say anything
to anybody about the summons having been served upon her". Holding
this to be error, the North Carolina court said: "In the first place, if the
witnesses had testified affirmatively that Mrs. Spencer had said that
the summons had not been served upon her, it would have been incompetent as hearsay. It is all the more incompetent in this negative form
that they had heard her say nothing about it, which proves nothing,
and if it proved anything, would tend to show that she had been
served." 4
Sherling v. Continental Trust Co.50 was an action based upon an
alleged oral agreement of defendant's testator to give to plaintiffs
"one-half of all the property that he might leave at his death". The
trial court permitted a witness for the defendant to testify that the
testator never said anything to her about such a contract. The Georgia
court held this error, declaring the evidence irrelevant and immaterial,
because "no circumstances were shown requiring (the testator) to
make any statement about the contract referred to or to admit or
deny the making of the same". And the Court continued: "If he
had denied to the witness making such a contract it would have been
objectionable as hearsay testimony." The Court likewise held erroneous
as "in the nature of hearsay" and as irrelevant, the testimony of the
wife of the testator's half-brother that "she had not heard (the halfbrother) make any statement in reference to his or (the testator) having made a contract" such as plaintiffs alleged. It is a fair conclusion
that in its ruling the appellate court placed its principal reliance upon its
determination that the testimony of these witnesses was irrelevant,
because it likewise held erroneous the admission of the testimony of one
of the same witnesses that plaintiff herself "had never said anything in
the presence of the witness in reference to a contract (of the testator)
to leave her- any property". Latham v. Houston Land & Trust Co.5 1
is a case of the same sort. The suit was one to recover a trust fund
alleged to have been placed in the hands of defendant's testator during
48. 6 WIGMOR, EVIDENCE (3d ed. i94o ) § 1716 et seq.
49. Lake Drainage Commissioners v. Spencer, i74 N. C. 36, 93 S. E. 435 (197).
SO. 175 Ga. 672, 165 S. E. 56o (932).
51. 62 S. W. (2d) 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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his lifetime for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs. Defendant denied
the creation and existence of the alleged trust fund. The trial court
admitted testimony of the alleged settlor's widow and attorney that he
had never mentioned the creation or existence of the trust to them.
The Texas court held that the evidence was properly admitted: "This
testimony is cogent and material. It is not hearsay testimony. It is a
statement of fact . .

."

In Segars v. City of Cornelia 2 an issue

was the execution by plaintiff's deceased wife of an easement agreement. The trial court refused to permit plaintiff to testify that he and
his wife "always consulted with each other with reference to all business
transactions, and that if she had made this easement she would have told
him so and she made a statement in his presence immediately after the
easement was purported to have been signed, and nothing was said to
him about having signed an easement". The Georgia court held that
the exclusion of this evidence was proper: "Even if Mrs. Segars
had then denied giving the easement, such denial would not be
admissible because it would be hearsay, and might also be a self-serving
declaration."
Though of a somewhat different sort, the remaining case, People
v. Laynutn,53 appears to belong in the second group. Defendant was
charged with perjury in having testified in a prior civil action, instituted by him against a railway company, to the occurrence of a nonoccurring accident. He was injured, he had testified, "as he was
pushing his stalled automobile away from the street car tracks". For
the state, all the motormen on the line testified that no such accident
occurred. In addition, all of the conductors testified that they knew
of no accident and the train dispatchers testified that they had received no report of an accident. The defendant contended, on appeal,
that the testimony of the train dispatchers was hearsay, but said the
California court, "it was not hearsay, but direct proof, of course, of
a fact; the fact being that no report had been turned in." This fact
was considered material because of the presumption that the ordinary
course of business had been followed, 54 "that is, that if there had
been an accident, it would have been reported to the dispatchers". Despite the court's confidence that the evidence was not hearsay, it seems
plain that the problem is just as clearly presented as in any of the
silence cases, and it is difficult to see how the statute, which merely
goes to the extent of recognizing that in the ordinary course of business an accident will be reported, disposes of the hearsay question.
52. 6o Ga. App. 457, 4 S. E. (2d) 6o (1939).
53. 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P. (2d) 244 (193r).
54. CAL. CODa Civ. PROC. (I93I) § 1963, sub. 20.
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Now, the inferential process involved in the evidential use of the
conduct in both classifications is very evidently the same. In the first
group, relevancy of the evidence of conduct depends upon inferences
from the failure of the buyer to complain, to his belief that the goods
were of good or specified quality, to the fact that they were of that
quality; or, in a situation like that presented in the Sullivan case, upon
inferences from the failure to make claim, to the individual's belief
that he had not been hurt, to the fact that he was not hurt, with an
additional inference here to the non-occurrence or insignificance of the
accident. Analogously, in the second classification, relevancy depends
upon inferences from the failure to speak, to the belief of the silent
individual that the disputed act or event did not occur, to the nonoccurrence itself. Yet, while the relevancy of this evidence of
"silence" rests, in both cases, on the same circumstantial analysisfailure to speak, to belief, to the fact believed-there is reason to suggest that the evidence typified by the cases in the first group is, theoretically, more trustworthy and, quite obviously, of more probative
force than that illustrated by the second group of cases.
But before undertaking this comparison, there are some things
to be said which are applicable to all the silence cases. Admissibilit3'
of evidence of conduct generally, it has been suggested, should depend
upon a preliminary finding "that the conduct was important or significant to the actor in his affairs and so vouched his belief 'as to give
reasonable assurance of trustworthiness' ". It is apparent that, generally, the avouchment in case of negative conduct (inaction) is definitely weaker than in the case of positive or affirmative conduct. 55
55. This conclusion finds support in the fact that, aside from any hearsay question,
even the relevancy of a failure to complain has, in a good many cases, been denied.
Thus, in S. J. Van Lill Co. v. Frederick City Packing Co., 155 Md. 303, 141 Atl. 898
(1928), the court said: "The fact that Ralston Company did not complain of the quality
of the goods had no necessary connection with any issue in the case. It may have
known the grade and quality before it purchased, or it may have been unwilling to incur
the annoyance and expense of a controversy, so that while its failure to complain,
standing alone, may have had some possible probative force, it was too remote to warrant its recognition as judicial proof, and this question should not be allowed." For
reference to a number of cases which, though not passing upon the hearsay question,
discuss the admissibility of evidence of silence in terms of relevancy, see note 56 infra.
A majority of these cases held the evidence inadmissible, although it should be noted
that in a number of the excluding decisions the rulings were based on the insufficiency
of the showing of similarity of the goods sold or of the contract specifications.
It is, of course, true, as the Maryland court says, that the proposed inference from
the failure to complain to the belief that the goods were of specified quality is not an
absolutely necessary one. But relevancy is not usually so rigorously conditioned. "The
requirement that circumstantial evidence must be explainable only, or most convincingly, upon the inference relied on by the proponent, is not one usually applied by the
courts in testing relevancy. A moment's survey of familiar types of circumstantial evidence (e. g., evidence of threats and opportunity to commit an act as evidence of its
commission) will show that no such test for a particular item of proof is customarily
required for its admission. It may look both ways, but it is for the adversary to argue
its contrary bearing to the jury. All that is required for admission is that the item
offered, taken alone or in conjunction with other evidence in the case, might suggest
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Failure to complain does, in a measure, vouch the buyer's belief that
the goods were of satisfactory or specified quality; still this mere inaction, this failure to speak, is definitely less persuasive of the trustworthiness of the buyer's apparent belief than would be the case if
the conduct were affirmative in character, i. e., if the buyer had performed positive, important conduct on the faith of that belief, for
example, if he had repeatedly made important use of the goods purchased. And the failure of the alleged recipient of the writ to mention
it to members of her family does not necessarily represent conduct
important to her. So that there appears to be grave question as to
whether a rational application of the criterion heretofore proposed
would operate to admit much, if any, evidence of negative conduct.
Consequently, if it be concluded, as it is believed it should, that failure
to speak is, under some circumstances, sufficiently trustworthy for its
consideration by the tribunal, some modification of the suggested formula appears to be demanded.
Now, comparing the trustworthiness of the evidence typified by
the two groups of cases, substantial differences appear in at least two
respects.
First: it is probable that there is more danger that conduct typified by cases in the second group (i. e., the mere failure to mention an
act or event which, had it occurred, would have been within the personal knowledge of the silent individual) was intended by the individual to have been assertive than in the case of conduct generally,
or in the case of the conduct typified by cases in the first group (i. e.,
failure of the buyer to complain of the quality of goods or the failure
of one who might have been injured in an accident, had it occurred
or been of consequence, to complain of injury). It is hard to conceive of more than a remote possibility that the buyer of goods, by
his failure to complain, intended to express the idea that the goods
were of good quality, because it is plain that his silence, for him, is
disserving in character. The same may be said of the failure of the
passengers on the suddenly stopped street car to make complaint of
injury. This detrimental quality rather effectually negatives the possibility that the silence was intended as assertive. But in respect to
conduct like that involved in the Spencer and Sherling cases, supra,
the inference proposed to a reasonable man, not that the judge must believe that the inference is more probable than not. Sufficiency, of course, is another story." McCormick, Privilege in the Law of Evidence (938) 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 457. There seems
little doubt that evidence of failure to complain "might suggest the inference proposed
[that the buyer believed the goods to be of specified quality] to a reasonable man". Or,
using Wigmore's phrasing (I WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. i94o) §§ 31, 32, 38), not
only does the desired conclusion appear to be "a natural or plausible one among the
various conceivable ones", but quite evidently "more plausible" and "more natural" than
any other conceivable conclusion.
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namely, the failure of one alleged to have been served with summons
to mention the service, or of one alleged to have made an agreement
to mention the agreement, there is an absence of any such disserving
or detrimental quality. Not only that, but the silence might easily
have been foreseen by the silent individual to possess a possible selfserving evidential use. That is to say, it is entirely possible that in
such situations, the silence, i. e., the failure to mention the service of
the writ or the making of the agreement, may have been intended as
assertive, that is, intended by the silent individual to have impliedly
expressed the idea that she had not been served or that he had not
made the agreement. Particularly might this be the case where the
period or a substantial part of the period of silence, sought to be evidenced, commenced after the possibility of controversy became apparent to the silent individual.
Theoretically, however, this circumstance does not indicate any
deficiency in the previously suggested formula as applicable to evidence of silence, because that formula purports to deal only with nonassertive conduct. It does follow, however, that in determining preliminarily whether the conduct was actually non-assertive, evidence
of silence typified by the second group of cases should be scrutinized
with particular care.
Second: However, aside from any question of veracity, that is
to say, assuming that silence of the second sort was not intended as
assertive, there is quite obviously a substantial difference in trustworthiness, in respect to the actor's observation and recollection, between the silence typified by the two groups of cases. This difference
in reliability rests upon the fact that the silence typified by the first
group was detrimental to the actor, while that typified by the second
group was not. No more than unimportant or trivial affirmative conduct, does mere silence, when not palpably detrimental or disserving
to the silent individual, appear to represent sufficient avouchment of
the actor's apparent belief to warrant more favorable treatment than
that given the ordinary hearsay assertion.
If there be substance to the foregoing, the test heretofore proposed for the admissibility of evidence of non-assertive conduct requires some modification, if it is to deal with negative conduct, and
particularly -silence, in a rational manner. Restated and rephrased with
this end in view, the suggestion, then, is that while hearsay should be
defined so as to include not only utterances but also non-assertive conduct, where relevancy depends upon inferences from the conduct to
the belief of the actor to the fact believed, evidence of such nonassertive conduct should be exceptionally admitted if, but only if, the
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trial judge first finds that (a) the actor had personal knowledge of
the fact (i. e., the occurrence of the event or the existence of the
condition) to the proof of which the evidence is offered; more precisely, that it fairly appears that the actor observed or had the opportunity to observe such event or condition and that nothing appears
to cast substantial doubt upon the quality of his recollection at the
time of the conduct; and (b) that the conduct was important or significant to the actor in his affairs and so vouched his belief "as to give
reasonable assurance of trustworthiness", and (c) in the case of negative conduct (i. e., inaction) or silence, that such negative conduct or
silence was a detriment to the actor.
The number of cases considering silence as hearsay is hardly an
accurate indication of the consequence of the problem because the
hearsay question has been present, potentially, in many cases where
it was not identified." Plausibly, and supported by a respectable number of decisions, an objection invoking the hearsay rule may be interposed to evidence of silence in a rather wide variety of situations, and
in this circumstance this discussion largely seeks its justification.
56. In the following cases the admissibility of evidence of silence was considered,
though the hearsay question was not discussed and, presumably, was not raised.
Evidence held admissible: Steil v. Holland, 3 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 9th, i925) ; Baer
Grocer Co. v. Barber Milling Co., 223 Fed. 969 (C. C. A. 4th, I915) ; Katz v. Delohery Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 Atl. 88 (1922); Mears v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.,
75 Conn. 17i, 52 Atl. 61o (i9o2); Landfield v. Albiani Lunch Co., 268 Mass. 528, i68
N. E. i6o (1929); Sloan v. Sloan, 32 S. W. (2d) 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o).
Evidence held inadmissible: Winter-Loeb Grocery Co. v. Boykin, 2o3 Ala. 187, 82
So. 437 (i919) ; Siegel, King & Co. v. Penny & Baldwin, 176 Ark. 336, 2 S. W. (2d)
zo82 (1928) ; Watson v. Bigelow Co., 77 Conn. 124, 58 At. 74i (19o4) ; Hutchinson
Lumber Co. v. Dickerson, 127 Ga. 328, 56 S. E. 491 (907) ; Treschman v. Treschman,
28 Ind. App. 2o6, 61 N. E. 961 (igoi) ; Van Lill Co. v. Frederick City Packing Co.,
i55 Md. 303, 141 Atl. 898 (1928); Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 92, 77 At. 258

(igio) ; Webster v. Moore & Son, io8 Md. 572, 71 Atl. 466 (i9o8) ; Osborne & Co. v.

Bell, 62 Mich. 214, 28 N. W. 841 (1886); Bloom's Son Co. v. Haas, 130 Mo. App. 122,

1o8 S. W. 1078 (i9o8); Shaw Cotton Mills v. Acme Hosiery Mills, 187 N. C. 33, io6
S. E. 24 (1921) ; New York Canners, Inc. v. Milbourne, 247 N. Y. 46o, i6 N. E. 914
(1928); Reed Grocery Co. v. Miller, 36 Okla. 134, 128 Pac. 271 (1912); Karlen v.
Trebble, 45 S. D. 570, 189 N. W. 519 (1922) ; Goldsmith v. Ohio Truss Co., 283 S. W.
299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Elmberg Co. v. Dunlap Hardware Co., 267 S. W. 258
(Comm. of App. of Tex. Sec. A, 1924) ; Hill v. Hanan & Son, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 191,
131 S. W. 245 (igio) ; Haynie v. Piano Mfg. Co., 36 Ten. Civ. App. 567, 82 S. W.
532 (1904) ; Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis. 38 (1863).

In the following additional cases, evidence of silence apparently went in without
objection: Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N. E. (2d) 465 (1936) ; Monahan v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 282 Mass. 548, 185 N. E. 34 (933) ; Gracey v.
Waldorf System, Inc., 25r Mass. 76, 146 N. E. 232 (1925).

